ABSTRACT The wireless radio communications channel between two legitimate user terminals has long been considered as a renewable source of shared secrecy. As characterization of the channel, the timevarying channel impulse response (CIR) is commonly used for this purpose due to its reciprocity and inherent difficulty in being captured by an adversary. While each terminal generates a secret key at its side, based on its own channel measurements combined with an independent noise component, mismatches may occur in the extracted information or in the obtained bit sequences after a sampling and quantization process. To mitigate such bit mismatches, we propose a method that utilizes the properties of the Golay code to correct or detect the bit mismatches for CIR-based secret key agreement. In our approach, the reconciliation information in the transmission is deliberately designed to hide the original shared information (perfect or imperfect). The correctness of our bit mismatch mitigation algorithm is thoroughly analyzed for all possible scenarios. In addition, the effectiveness of our algorithm is validated through simulations using MATLAB for generated CIR data, the results of which match our theoretical analysis. Our design is shown to be secure and optimal by security analysis and comparisons between our proposed algorithm and its variants. The comparisons with related techniques and the scenarios in which our design can benefit are also discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless network technologies such as Wi-Fi and Zigbee are among the key enablers of the Internet-of-Things (IoT) revolution that will allow the interaction of tens of billions of smart devices [1] - [4] . Preventing IoT targeted intrusion through novel and scalable wireless network authentication mechanisms and cryptosystems is crucial for the success of the IoT revolution. It is widely envisioned that physical layer characteristics of the wireless channels will play an important role in this respect since the wireless channel between the communicating parties can be used as a source of shared secrecy [5] - [12] . However, many key challenges remain in transforming this potential into practical security solutions for various wireless network scenarios including the IoT, where low processing overhead and complexity requirements should be considered when choosing or designing the reconciliation techniques.
There is a broad existing body of proposed methods to extract secret bits from wireless channel measurements and encoding of multipath wireless channels by utilizing their inherent characteristics of reciprocity, temporal variations, and spatial decorrelation [5] - [10] , [13] - [16] . Based on the reciprocity principle, the two nodes of a wireless communication channel obtain identical channel state information (CSI) values from measurements conducted independently on each side, provided that the measurements are close enough temporally and in frequency. Secrecy of the shared information arises from the spatial decorrelation property, which ensures that an eavesdropper separated by at least half a wavelength from the two legitimate parties would experience a different channel. Thus, the independent channel measurements obtained by the two nodes can be converted to a sequence of shared secret bits.
In realistic scenarios, several challenges need to be addressed to exploit these channel-based secrets. Despite the reciprocity of the wireless channel, the measurements taken at the two nodes may not be identical for factors such as non-simultaneous timing measurements, additive noise, channel frequency and interference. Each node then converts its CIR measurements to a sequence of bits through a sampling, quantization and reconciliation process, which may also discard a subset of the measurements to reduce the mismatch probability between the two nodes and increase the entropy [6] - [9] , [14] , [15] . The discrepancies between the bits obtained at the two nodes after sampling and quantization are traditionally eliminated through a process of information reconciliation. Reconciliation may leak some information to a passive adversary as it involves some communications over a public channel. Hence, a privacy amplification step may be used to increase the bit secrecy after the reconciliation. Note that these techniques involve the often-conflicting goals of low disagreement rate between the communicating parties, low-correlation bit extraction, low probing overhead, and ultimately high-rate secret bit generation. Some of the techniques proposed for reducing disagreement rate may, for instance, discard a sizable portion of measured data through quantization [7] , [14] (by censoring data points that are above/below a threshold and subsampling [7] , [14] ), which may substantially lower the practically achievable secrecy rate.
The focus of this paper is on mitigating the bit mismatches between two communicating parties. We propose a Golay code based approach for this purpose, and illustrate its ability to detect and correct such mismatches up to a certain level. We also evaluate its robustness against a passive adversary.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. An overview of Golay code properties and related information reconciliation techniques is provided in Section II, followed by a thorough description and correctness analysis of the bit mismatch mitigation algorithm in Section III. Section IV describes the simulation design and compares the results to previous theoretical analysis. Section V presents a security analysis. We finally discuss the algorithm's variants and their validity and then provide a conclusion.
II. OVERVIEW OF GOLAY CODE PROPERTIES
When two parties, which share similar but not exact analog samples of data, wish to reconcile their differences, the process typically begins with a conversion of the analog samples into digital or binary format. The desire is for this conversion to generally preserve the level of similarity in the Hamming distance (we define ''similarity'' in such a manner for this context) between their converted binary representations with increasing level of difference. The simplest analog to digital conversion in binary format is not suitable. For example, numerical values with a moderate difference can have a large Hamming distance (e.g. compare binary 127 with binary 128). Gray code conversion is a very simple representation for small differences but cannot map the numerical difference to Hamming distance linearly, beyond a single bit error, which can lead to serious problems with regards to the current application context. After Gray code conversion, a moderate difference in analog values can have a large Hamming distance and very different analog values can have a small Hamming distance.
The Golay code is a type of linear error correction codes (ECC), which is designed for encoding messages before transmitting through noisy channels. ECC have mainly two operations: encoding a message by adding some syndrome information, and decoding to recover the original message even if some errors have been introduced by a noisy channel. The Golay code can correct any 3-bit errors in a Binary Symmetric Channel for every 23-bits of encoded data. Compared to other ECC, such as low density parity-check codes (LDPC) and Turbo Codes, the implementation of Golay codes is simpler and static, because the code length and word length are both fixed to 23 bits and 12 bits, respectively. The encoding process maps any 12-bit word into a 23-bit code by adding an 11-bit syndrome. The decoding process maps any 23-bit code into a 12-bit word by resolving errors of up to 3 bits (codes with more than 3 bits of error will be mapped to other words). The most advantageous property of the Golay code is that it is the only non-trivial (able to correct at least 3 bits per block) perfect binary code or binary ECC attaining the Hamming bound.
A. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GOLAY CODE
The main structure of the Golay code implementation is straightforward and static. 
B. GOLAY CODE PROPERTIES
The Golay code has the absolute symmetric structure in code space partitioning. For example, in the 23-bit codeword space, a code sphere center is denoted as the codeword without distortion. Each code sphere has a radius of 3 bits, which means up to three bits of distortion on the code sphere center would be decoded back to the same codeword. Thus, the Hamming distance between two neighboring spheres' centers are 7, and any 4-bit distortion would be mapped to a neighboring sphere. The first property we will use later is that any pair of neighboring sphere centers have different parity check bits because any pair of binary numbers with a Hamming distance of 7 would have different parity check bits.
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The second property is about the correspondence relation between any 12-bit data word and its 11-bit syndrome. The mapping between all 2 11 syndromes and all 2 12 data words is that for any 11-bit syndrome, there are exactly two different data words corresponding to it, and any data word has one and only one syndrome value. The difference, or the result of bitwise exclusive-or of two data words of the same syndrome is exactly the generator. The Golay code has a total of two generators, both having a Hamming weight of 7. 
C. OTHER ERROR CORRECTION CODES FOR RECONCILIATION
In early days, the information reconciliation was firstly inspired by the research in quantum key distribution. Techniques aiming to correct errors by interactive communications through a public channel have been developed, such as Cascade and Winnow [17] . In recent research [18] , reconciliation has been shown as a special case of channel coding. The two most popular ECC that can achieve the channel capacity under specific cases are the Turbo codes and LDPC codes. In [19] , a thorough study has been presented for the performance of the Turbo codes over the code block size, which shows that their performance almost monotonically increases with larger code block size under some limit. The performance approaches the bound very well when the code block size is over 10 4 or 10 5 bits due to different coding rate. For LDPC codes, we did a simple simulation of three different code block sizes of 648, 1296 and 1944 bits respectively and the result in Figure 1 shows that the performance degrades as the code block size shrinks. These two codes have the advantage of adaptive coding rate and code block size while the Golay code has constant coding rate and code block size which makes it less adaptable. However, in the aspect of code block size, Golay and the other two have their own advantages for different cases. For example, for code block sizes between 10 and 10 2 bits, Golay code is dominantly better [19] . The Turbo codes or LDPC codes usually require a code block size of 10 2 or more bits for appropriate performance. For example, the 3GPP LTE standard of Turbo codes has a minimum code block size of 40 bits. Since the information reconciliation is based on the channel reciprocity and the sampling period should be larger than the channel coherence time, our proposed algorithm would be a good choice in the case of relatively constant channel conditions with limited sample generation rate. Also in the realm of IoT applications, the devices can have limited processing power and the computational intensive decoding in Turbo and LDPC codes may not fit.
III. GOLAY CODE BASED BIT MISMATCH MITIGATION ALGORITHM A. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We assume two parties in a communication (Alice and Bob) use a public radio channel to sample their mutually shared CIR and resolve the differences on their independently observed CIR data. The ultimate goal is that Alice and Bob share some identical information that cannot be known by an adversary with a high probability. In the problem formulation, we assume an adversary can only have limited knowledge of Alice's and Bob's data, but has full access to information transmitted between Alice and Bob. The proper solution to resolve the information difference is to derive information from Alice's data such that: i) this information itself is insufficient to recover Alice's data with a high probability; but ii) this information together with Bob's data should be enough to recover Alice's data, or for Bob to inform Alice that the difference cannot be resolved. The channel is public, meaning that anything communicated over the channel may be known to anyone including an adversary.
We assume that there is an upper bound on the number of different bits for every synchronized 12-bit group of CIR sourced shared data between Alice and Bob. The bit difference bound on a small size of data, which in our case is every 12 bits, is stricter than that on a larger size group. To satisfy this assumption, some preprocessing like the public permutation can be done which is a common step for smoothing the error burst before information reconciliation [17] .
Contribution of Golay code application for information reconciliation involves the active randomness introduced in the transmitted syndrome, which has not been seen in conventional techniques. To structure the information to be transmitted, we utilize the error correction property of Golay codes for two purposes: to correct the bit mismatch and to introduce randomness in the transmitted information for security. The security comes from the random errors intentionally applied into the transmitted information, and to a certain extent, the error correction code can successfully correct all the 'errors' between the two sources. Due to the actual channel property, the bit mismatch may not be eliminated after our reconciliation algorithm. But a properly designed cyclic redundancy check (CRC) for the expected post-reconciliation error rate can be used as acknowledgement for identical secrecy at both sides. VOLUME 7, 2019 B. ALGORITHM DESIGN To obtain a pair of binary sequences from mutually measured CIR data, some processing is applied, such as quantization and converting the numerical values into binary format. Since these processes are not related to our design of an algorithm for bit mismatch mitigation, we will explain them in the simulation section. After Alice and Bob each have a synchronized binary sequence, we first group synchronized data between Alice and Bob into 12-bit groups. We then consider the bit mismatch mitigation process in every group. Based on the data difference upper bound per group for a measured channel condition, Alice and Bob agree to set the protocol parameter to a specific value. To explain our algorithm, we will consider the following case.
To illustrate our algorithm, suppose that there are at most 2-bit differences for every 12 bits. We denote Alice's and Bob's data as A and B, so the Hamming distance, HD(A, B) ≤ 2. Then Alice calculates an 11-bit syndrome S(A) and a parity check bit p(A) for A + S(A) (plus denotes concatenation). Then Alice randomly flips 2 bits in S(A), and gets S (A). To randomly choose two bits to flip, Alice may use a pseudo-random function. Finally, Alice sends S (A) and p(A) to Bob. After receiving the 12-bit data, Bob concatenates B with S (A), and then decodes B + S (A). The decoding process will give Bob a 12-bit code sphere center and its corresponding 11-bit syndrome. We denote them as
Deco(B) and Synd(B). It is hoped that Deco(B) equals A. Bob calculates the parity check bit p(B) for Deco(B) + Synd(B).
If p(A) = p(B), then Deco(B) = A and Bob keeps the data. Otherwise, Bob was unable to reconcile the data and therefore discards the data. The decision is notified to Alice so that Alice and Bob take the same action to keep or discard the data. The complete process is shown in Figure 2 where HD(A, B) is assumed to be at most 2 and the number of bits in S(A) to be flipped is 2. Our algorithm in fact works when HD(A, B) ≤ 1, 2, or 3 by applying the same process in Figure 2 by setting a different number of bits to be flipped. Figure 3 shows a summary of performance of the data recovery capability and a security analysis, in which the algorithm can recover more errors but is less secure when fewer bits are flipped. 
C. ALGORITHM CORRECTNESS ANALYSIS
Upon receiving S (A)+p(A), Bob has B+S (A), the Hamming distance between B + S (A) and A + S(A) in our algorithm is designed to be at most 4. For example, if we introduce a 2-bit distortion in S(A), so the maximum Hamming distance between A and B is 2, and the summation is 4. No matter how we set the algorithm parameter from 1 to 3 bits of distortion in S(A), the sum of the bit distortion in S(A) and the maximum Hamming distance between A and B is at most 4, a property our algorithm assumes.
To verify the correctness of the algorithm, we consider two cases. The first case is when the Hamming distance between B + S (A) and A + S(A) is at most 3. In this case, the Golay code decoding process will ensure that p(B) = p(A) and thus Deco(B) = A; hence, Bob can extract A.
In the second case when the Hamming distance between B + S (A) and A + S(A) is 4, B + S (A) and A + S(A) are in neighboring spheres with HD(B + S (A), A + S(A)) = 7 (See Figure 4) . Thus, p(B) = p(A). In this case, Bob will discard the data and notify Alice of this decision.
Under the assumption of bit difference upper bound per group, for any specific number of bit distortion in the syndrome S(A), we will have multiple cases depending on the Hamming distance between A and B, which may be 0, 1, or 2. Our algorithm can make each case distinguishable or reportable, mainly because the decoding process can provide Bob information on which layer the B + S (A) is located. Distinguishable cases can correctly determine whether to accept or discard the current group, and also can report the actual Hamming distance between A and B. This information in fact can be a good reference for Bob to adjust the algorithm parameter. Figure 5 ). In this case, the parity check bit does not match; hence, it is distinguishable and can report the actual Hamming distance between A and B. (ii) B + S (A) is on the third layer of a distance-2 neighboring spheres (see Figure 6 ). In this case, the parity check bit matches but Bob should discard this result since the Hamming distance between the two centers is 8. This case is ambiguous and not distinguishable from the former case. Thus, Bob cannot determine the actual Hamming distance between A and B. If this case happens, Bob may further check the number of bits distorted in the syndrome to see whether it matches the protocol settings or not. However, this extra check would only work successfully with a probability.
IV. SIMULATION AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS A. SIMULATION DESIGN
We implemented our bit mismatch mitigation algorithm in MATLAB to analyze its performance on simulated channel impulse response (CIR) data based on an ITU channel model (ITUr3GPAx from MATLAB implementation of channel models specified in 3GPP standard). The simulation comprises a scenario that generates a sequence of CIR data from the first 4 Path Gains with SNR 30 dB as shown in Figure 7 . The channel's block error rates (BLER) over SNR is in Figure 8 .
The next step is to convert the sequence of complex numbers into binary format. The way we treat this problem is straight and simple in two steps. We first calculate the absolute value of CIR's sequence of complex numbers to get a sequence of real numbers. Then we calculate the arithmetic average of the sequence of real numbers. The quantization and conversion into binary format becomes one step: every real number above or equal to the arithmetic average is set to 1, otherwise set to 0. The window size for the arithmetic average calculation and quantization have little effect on the binary matching rate with reasonable size windows. For example, in the simulations, using a window size of 300 or more samples in a sampling period of 0.0001 second results in similar binary matching rates after quantization and binary conversion. This method of conversion is simple, but works well in our case. Before we apply our bit mismatch mitigation algorithm, we need some public random permutation on both sides. Its purpose has no relation to the security concern, but to the Golay code structure. Since our quantization and conversion into binary format depends on the arithmetic average, its output can be many consecutive 1's or 0's in a row, which results in low entropy bits. In addition, a good random permutation can also smoothen bit mismatch among groups due to the experimental result.
The general design of the simulation is shown in Figure 9 . We conduct analysis in two aspects: how the public communication releases the information of the original data, and how different Alice's data is from Bob's resolved copy. 
B. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The simulation results confirm our analytical results discussed in the previous sections. The two questions on the information leakage and mismatch mitigation performance are also answered in the simulation results. Here we analyze a concrete example, in which we choose to use CIR data from MATLAB ITU channel and set the SNR as 30 dB, sampling duration as 0.0001 second, number of CIR samples as 120,000 and number of path gains to use as 1. The result is shown in Table 1 .
In Table 1 , the setting is first summarized: the maximum number of bit difference per 12-bit group that our algorithm can handle is two; for each 12-bit group, the sender randomly picks two bits from its 11-bit syndrome and distorts them (i.e., flip 0 to 1 and 1 to 0) before transmission. The setting of CIR data generation is also given.
The data size available at each side is 120,000 bits grouped into 10,000 groups (12 bits in each group) in which 2,644 of the 120,000 bits were mismatched. Among the 10,000 groups, 146 groups are such that the number of mismatches in the corresponding group at the other side is more than two. We applied an identical, publicly known permutation function at each side to distribute the bit disparities among groups. Because of the method that we chose to convert a complex number sequence into a binary sequence, a random permutation function can effectively evenly distribute the bit differences among groups. After this process, the total number of bit differences remains at 2,644, but only 22 groups have a bit difference of more than two. We take the resulting pair of bit sequences as an input to our mismatch mitigation algorithm.
We apply our mismatch mitigation algorithm for each 12-bit group. During the simulation, we also calculate the bit bias for the data source and public transmission. For the data source, each of the 12-bits is a little biased to 0, but no good explanation was identified. However, the bit bias of information in public transmission is less than 1%, which is in the range of 49% ∼ 51%. That is, the probability of a bit to be 1 or 0 is around 50% with high probability in the output bit sequence of our algorithm. Upon completion of the algorithm, the number of bit mismatches is 32, a great reduction from 2,644. When the SNR is set to 20 dB with the other parameters the same, the algorithm reduces the mismatched bits from 8,169 of 120,000 to 573 of 98,220; or from 93.19% to 99.42%.
In summary, experimental results match with our analytical results over different settings of algorithm parameters. Furthermore, the algorithm successfully reduces the number of mismatched bits. 
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We assume that an adversary Eve has no knowledge of the data shared by Alice and Bob. However, the transmitted data S (A) and p(A) are known to Eve. For the security analysis of our algorithm, the process is divided into two consecutive phases. The first phase is on the data source and its corresponding syndrome with parity check bit. The second phase is on the randomly introduced bit distortions in the syndromes.
Firstly, there is a one-to-one correspondence between data source and its syndrome paired with a parity check bit (see Section II). So, its security depends on the data source itself which is not our concern. Due to the Golay code properties, there are exactly two data words corresponding to any syndrome, and the difference between them is the generator which has a Hamming weight of 7. This means that two data words with the same syndrome have a different parity check bit. So, knowing the syndrome S(A) and the parity check bit p(A), Alice's data A can be revealed.
Secondly, Alice introduces distortions on randomly selected bits of a word. This random process can be performed using a process which may be known only by Alice. Depending on the selection of the algorithm parameter, Alice may introduce distortions of 1, 2 or 3 randomly selected bits in S(A); so there are totally . These numbers (i.e., the probability that Eve can correctly guess Alice's data) seem too high to be considered secure. However, as there are multiple groups of 12-bit data, say k groups, the probability 1 p k i that Eve can correctly guess Alice's actual bit sequence is extremely small for any p i even for a small value of k, say k = 10.
VI. ALGORITHM VARIATIONS
In this section, we discuss a few variations of our bit mismatch mitigation algorithm, and conclude that the proposed algorithm design is the best among them. At last, we discuss the security from an adversary's point of view.
A. RANDOMLY DISTORTING ACTUAL DATA BITS INSTEAD OF THE SYNDROME
We consider a variation where instead of distorting random bits in the calculated syndrome, we distort bits in the actual data word and calculate its syndrome for transmission. We analyzed the case where HD(A, B) ≤ 2 and the other cases would be similar. In the variation, we randomly selected 2 bits in A and flipped them. We denote the result as A . Then, we calculated the syndrome of A , and denote it as S(A). Alice transmits S(A) to Bob. Bob wants to recover A with the knowledge of B and HD(A, B) ≤ 2. Upon receiving S(A), because of the 1-to-2 mapping from syndrome to data, Bob will have A and A , where A and A have the same syndrome S(A). The difference between A and A is exactly the generator, and their HD is 7. So, Bob has A and A and knowing that one of them has a HD of 2 to A. Through an exhaustive search, we identified the results shown in Table 2 .
If Bob has a HD of 3 and 4 for two resolved syndromes, it is not possible to distinguish A from A without additional information. Since HD(A , A ) = 7, the extra parity check bit can provide the information to resolve the problem. But solving the problem in this way has more complex logical processing on Bob's side, and the most prominent disadvantage is the 13 bits for transmission which uses one more bit than our design.
B. PARTIALLY REVEALING THE SYNDROME INSTEAD OF DISTORTION
In this variation, Alice transmits a partial syndrome instead of the distorted one. We analyze a specific example in this type. Suppose Alice calculates S(A) and sends 9 bits to Bob from the 11 bits. The positions of these bits should be public; otherwise Bob could not reconstruct Alice's data for the Golay code structure we use. We denote S9(A) as Alice's first 9 bits. After Bob gets S9(A), the empty positions are randomly filled. The analysis for Bob to reconstruct Alice's data would be the same as our original algorithm. But the number of possible syndromes that can be known by the adversary is 2 2 = 4. Therefore, the adversary with S(A) can know the correct S(A) with 25% probability. Comparatively, the probability for introducing 2 bits of error is We also analyze a specific example that Alice randomly chooses 2 bits in the syndrome S(A). Suppose that with probability p, Alice flips the bit and with probability 1 − p, she keeps the bit. Bob recovers A as before (with at most 1 bit different between A and B; otherwise, the extra parity check bit is necessary). On the other hand, from the adversary point of view, Eve can get S(A) with probability (1−p) 2 +(1 − p)p/10+p 2 /55, or 101p 2 /110−19p/10+1, VOLUME 7, 2019 and the minimum value occurs when p = 209 / 202, which is impossible since p ≤ 1. Therefore, the best strategy is to always flip the bit.
D. WHAT IS THE BEST STRATEGY FOR THE ADVERSARY?
In this discussion, we analyze the best strategy for the adversary. Suppose the data source has some distribution pattern, then because of the one-to-one mapping from data source to the transmitted data (syndrome with parity check bit), the information before applying distortion will follow the exact same distribution with some permutation. Thus, from the adversary's point of view, it is best to analyze the probability spectrum of data source. On the other side, the actions of 'keeping' or 'denying' data from Bob's acknowledgement to Alice only releases the information of how big the difference between A and B is. It does not give the adversary any information on the probability distribution. Combining these two points, the adversary can only have limited knowledge on A and B (no more than what was released) if the data source is random enough.
VII. RELATED WORK
This paper advances the research area of information reconciliation for secrecy extraction from wireless communication channels [5] , [14] , [20] . Premnath [5] describe and design a public secrecy extraction process from the physical layer by three different stages: quantization, information reconciliation and privacy amplification. Each stage is treated independently whereas our solution considers and solves the problem as a whole. Reference [5] targets the application in secret key extraction while the streaming mutually measured RSS values from a reciprocal channel could hardly guarantee identical pair of data for secret key extraction because of the information reconciliation techniques. Our proposed method specifically targets an application to continuous re-authentication in wireless IoT systems, since authentication does not necessarily require absolute identical information and a constant stream of source data may be available for continuous/frequent processing. After the quantization, a process for converting different quantization intervals into binary format is required. References [5] and [14] use the Gray code, even though it only works when consecutive intervals are converted into adjacent codes. When non-consecutive cases happen and because Gray code cannot map the arithmetic distance into Hamming distance linearly, it may work incorrectly by converting moderately different numbers into binary numbers with huge Hamming distance.
Ye et al. [14] the LDPC error correction code for information reconciliation, which provides more flexibility in implementation compared to our Golay code based design. The main difference from our work is that their generated syndrome for public communication is not distorted for security concern. It is because the LDPC code can be implemented in such a way that the syndrome has some level of security for public communications. However, this method requires extensive computing power especially for the decoding process, which is a different application scenario from our target of an IoT environment. Besides solving the information reconciliation problem by error correction code, some work [20] exploits the ''Deep Fades'' statistically matching property of wireless channel and designs the solution. This work also makes extra channel property assumptions that go beyond our work. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to utilize the Golay error correction code for security and the information reconciliation problem for IoT applications.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our bit mismatch mitigation algorithm improves the matching rate of CIR data between two parties in a wireless communication. The CIR data is a type of streaming data source, secure and rich. However, with our bit mismatch mitigation algorithm or any other mitigation algorithm, it is difficult to guarantee an identical and secure data pair from CIR data. For this reason, such data may not be suitable for generating a key for encryption or decryption, which requires an identical pair of bit sequences.
A better application scenario for our proposed bit mismatch mitigation algorithm is re-authentication, especially in an IoT environments due to the need for a high efficiency of implementation compared with approaches such as LDPC based algorithms. Pairing devices in a communication session measure each other's CIR data and apply our mismatch mitigation algorithm so that they both have a copy of nearly identical bit sequences. Following a formal authentication between the two communicating devices, the Golay code based approach may be used for continuous re-authentication using an authentication method that can handle imperfect authentication codes such as our earlier work presented in ICC 2016 [21] . Furthermore, the history of CIR data (after mitigating the bit differences) accumulated over time will only enhance the security level as it becomes inherently difficult to eavesdrop. YOGENDRA SHAH received the B.Sc. and Ph.D. degrees in electronic engineering from London University, U.K., in 1982 and 1985, respectively. He was with the wireless industry, developing products and services, incorporating security and wireless technologies, such as the early digital cordless phones to the latest 5G wireless systems. His current research interests include developing security and advanced wireless communications technologies. He is a CISSP member and a member of the IEEE. VOLUME 7, 2019 
